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ABSTRACT 
This paper is divided into three parts. Part I contains a brief 
discussion of traditional theories for, and the actual methods of, 
economic regulation. It also examines factors that have influenced 
global trends toward deregulation--e.g.,regulatory failure, poor 
performance, labor market problems and budgetary concerns. Part II 
examines some of the U.S. academic literature that has analyzed the 
political economy of economic deregulation in the United States and 
the factors that drove deregulation. Chief among these factors 
includes: the convergence of elite opinion in support of reform and 
the important contribution of economic analysis in the reform 
process; the proactive exercise of leadership by policymakers; the 
role of independent regulatory agencies and courts which allowed 
for considerable deregulation to occur without Congressional 
action; and the role of Congress. Drawing on the structural 
features identified in part II, Part III of the paper examines the 
political economy of economic deregulation in Japan, both 
historically and at the current time. This paper argues that over 
the postwar period Japan has experienced a considerable degree of 
regulatory reform and economic deregulation. This has been driven 
by the interplay of four factors: the pluralization of interests 
within Japanese society; the emergence of domestic and 
international market-based pressures for change; external political 
pressures for change; and the perceived fiscal necessity to reduce 
public expenditures. Each of these factors is discussed in some 
detail. The paper also examines the current deregulation debate in 
Japan and identifies groups supportive and opposed to deregulation 
and regulatory reform. The paper argues that domestic and 
international market and technological factors have converged to 
necessitate on-going reforms. The costs to the Japanese economy of 
failing to continue the process seem to be sufficiently great that 
further reforms are expected. However, the paper discusses the 
role played by Japanese regulatory agencies, courts, policy makers 
and interest groups and argues that the institutional mechanisms 
that exist elsewhere to drive reform, or tolerate it, are less than 
robust in the Japanese setting. 
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Policy Approaches to Economic Deregulation and Regulatory Reform 
Introduction 
Over the last 20 years, a number of once heavily regulated sectors 
of OECD economies have been the focus of considerable economic 
deregulation and regulatory reform. The sectors chosen for 
deregulation, the approaches employed by policymakers, and the 
interplay of political, social and economic factors, have varied 
from nation to nation. 
There is no single or simple definition of deregulation and the 
term itself is not self-defining. A now classic definition of 
economic deregulation was advanced by George Stigler: namely, the 
state's withdrawal of its legal powers to direct the economic 
conduct of nongovernmental bodies1. Dr. Stigler's definition can 
encompass a very broad range of actions including the removal or 
reform of regulations on market entry and exit, output, services 
and prices. However, it may not fully encompass the use of other 
policy instruments that have been used in tandem with deregulation 
in some countries--e.g., the withdrawal or modification of 
exemptions from competition laws so as to extend such laws to 
encompass sectors of the economy previously immunized from 
enforcement of competition policy. Dr. Stigler's definition also 
does not automatically bring to mind privatizations or other 
restructurings of state-owned enterprises, that have been an 
1
 George Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell 
J. Econ., Spring 1971. 
1 
important recent development in Europe and, to some extent, in 
Japan. 
This paper uses the terminology economic deregulation and 
regulatory reform. Although admittedly over-broad, this 
terminology combines economic deregulation in the Stiglerian sense 
with other reform efforts inclusive of privatization, restructuring 
and the use of economy-wide measures such as competition policy. 
Since only in a few instances has economic deregulation resulted in 
the elimination of regulatory oversight of a previously regulated 
industry, deregulation has been a continuum in many countries. 
Typically, it is also a protracted and selective process. Economic 
deregulation has triggered debate in many countries as to the 
responsiveness, or lack of it, of economic regulations and 
deregulatory measures to social policy concerns such as health, 
safety, pollution control, employment, quality of life, etc. 
Many discussions of economic deregulation and regulatory reform to 
which I have been a party have ultimately turned on whether the 
discussant believes that an efficiency-based rationale for economic 
deregulation applies in a given instance, and if so, if it is 
sufficiently sensitive to broader social policy concerns. Although 
that assessment is important, this paper does not attempt to assess 
the costs and benefits of economic deregulation on a sectoral or 
national basis. Rather, it identifies some of the contours of the 
2 
policy environments that can influence approaches to economic 
deregulation and regulatory reform. 
Specifically, this paper is organized in the following manner: 
Section I begins with a very brief discussion of the traditional 
theories for, and the actual methods of, economic regulation. Since 
the current interest in economic deregulation stems in part from 
dissatisfaction with traditional approaches to and rationales for 
economic regulation, Section I will offer a context within which 
approaches to economic deregulation and regulatory reform can be 
examined. Many important details will only become evident when we 
examine specific sectoral experiences, which is not undertaken in 
a detailed fashion in this paper but shall be the focus of this 
conference. 
Section II will identify a wide array of political and economic 
factors influencing the nature and focus of economic deregulation 
in the United States, and thus provides a grounds for comparison 
with Japanese experiences with economic deregulation. It should be 
understood that U.S. experiences with economic deregulation are not 
being advanced as a template for economic deregulation and 
regulatory reform elsewhere. This paper makes no claims about the 
extent to which lessons arising out of the U.S. policy experience 
(which is looked at only in a general fashion) can be applied 
abroad. However, for the purpose of this discussion, we posit that 
3 
the extensive degree of economic deregulation and regulatory reform 
in the United States, the abundant U.S. academic literature on this 
subject, and perhaps even the demonstration effect of U.S. 
experiences, allows the U.S. experience to be a useful starting 
point for considering a range of political and institutional 
factors that can usefully be examined in the Japanese context. 
Section III briefly examines approaches to economic deregulation in 
the Japanese context. 
I. Regulation and the Move Toward Deregulation 
A. Rationales 
Traditional theory of economic regulation argues that regulation 
serves the public interest by correcting some form of market 
failure. An often-cited example of market failure are natural 
monopolies, where it was assumed that consumer welfare would not be 
maximized by allowing firms to pursue profit-maximizing strategies 
in markets that were not structurally competitive.2 A traditional 
assumption has been that the market cannot efficiently support more 
than one firm. 
Regulation may also be seen as justified under circumstances where 
competitive solutions exist but are seen as inefficient because of 
2
 Technological change, market based pressures, and the 
evolution of regulatory schemes have all come to challenge 
traditional notions of natural monopolies. 
4 
externalities (e.g., air or water pollution), inadequate 
information (e.g., a safety problem in a consumer product), public 
goods (e.g., a lighthouse) or the problem of the commons (e.g., 
over-use of shared natural resources). In each of such cases the 
production or consumption of the product has effects that go beyond 
those entities that are directly involved in the production or 
consumption of the product.3 
Broadly put, regulation traditionally has been viewed as necessary 
to remedy the types of market failure we have alluded to above. A 
general rationale for regulation has been that it "provides 
protection for consumers or workers".4 
Observers of U.S. business history argue that New Deal regulations 
in the U.S. transportation (railroad, trucking, airlines), 
communication (telephone and telegraph), energy (electric and gas) 
and financial sectors were all designed to in some sense stabilize 
3
 See, OECD, Regulatory Reform. Privatisation and 
Competition Policy (Paris:OECD 1992) at 12. 
4
 Paul W. MacAvoy, Industry Regulation and the Performance 
of the American Economy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992) 
at 1. Paul MacAvoy argues that in trucking rates and airline 
fares, for example, regulation was seen as necessary because 
rates varied widely from monopolistic to competitive levels. And 
in regulating retail gas, electricity and telephone companies, 
state and federal legislatures argued that cost based prices were 
necessary so that local monopolies could not set high and 
discriminatory prices. The underlying assessments of business 
conditions, of course varied. In airlines, for example, the early 
justification for regulation stemmed from arguments about "excess 
competition". In communications, in contrast, the underlying 
argument was often "natural monopoly". 
5 
competition through government control of price, profitability, 
entry, and restructuring.5 Such control was believed to be 
necessary to keep a tight lid on monopolies such as utilities and 
to deal with complex competitive problems (as in the case of 
railroads) for the public good. Much of the economic regulation 
introduced in the first quarter of the century in the United States 
was designed to curb the market power of firms and to protect 
consumers from monopoly power. A customary way of doing this was 
to create a regulatory agency endowed with wide powers to establish 
price ceilings in line with the costs of production and 
distribution6. 
New Deal legislation gave federal agencies far greater powers than 
earlier legislation.7 The main objectives of economic regulation 
in these industries included high quality, wide availability of 
service, secure contractual arrangements, and stable prices. 
Legislators also wished to ensure that all consumers could obtain 
services, even if this meant that certain customer prices are set 
low to ensure service, subsidized by customers who pay more. The 
oversight agencies then had to protect the regulated firms from 
5
 Richard H.K. Vietor, Contrived Competition: Economic 
Regulation and Deregulation, 1920s-1980s", Business History, Vol 
36 October 1994 Number 4 at 1. 
6
 P. MacAvoy, supra note 4. 
7
 Examples include the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act 
and the Natural Gas Act in 1938. 
6 
competitive entry that might erode the higher prices charged to 
other consumers in order to provide returns to cover the below-cost 
pricing to high-end customers.8 
Professor MacAvoy argues that much U.S. regulation was put in place 
to have stabilizing effects along these lines. He argues that the 
implication of stability was as follows: 
...companies licensed for service would offer prices that on 
average over a decade would be no more than sufficient to 
cover the average total (variable and capital) costs of 
service for all classes of consumers. With both averaging over 
time and over classes, regulation would then have one of two 
effects. It would either reduce monopolistic prices or require 
that excess revenues from continued monopolistic prices to 
some customers in some periods be used to subsidize services 
Q 
at prices below costs to other customers at other periods. 
B. Methods 
OECD studies have identified a number of generic methods of 
regulation. Regulation can encompass what it calls "structural 
regulation", i.e., a regulatory authority determines both entry and 
exit. 
Other forms of regulation may be aimed at "conduct". An example 
would be when governments attempt to direct the behavior of 
monopolies by placing limits on profits. A form of conduct 
regulation has been the approach taken by U.S. regulators in the 
telephone, electricity, gas, and airline industries, where ceilings 
were placed on the cost-of-service ratemaking. This system 
8
 P. MacAvoy, supra note 4 at 12. 
9
 Id. at 12. 
7 
reflects an administrative effort to apply a pricing formula 
through a statutory scheme that obliges the regulated firm to file 
tariffs containing proposed rates. The agency then has the right 
to suspend any new filing for a specified period, during which time 
it holds hearings and investigates the reasonableness of the 
charge.10 Ordinarily the goals of such ratemaking systems include: 
preventing excess profits; holding prices down to costs; avoiding 
economic allocative waste; eliminating inefficient production 
methods; and assuring administrative ease.11 
A further form of regulation that has been extensive in Europe is 
government ownership. Public enterprises have run the gamut from 
entities associated directly with ministries to publicly traded 
joint stock companies in which the government holds a majority 
share but is largely a passive shareholder12. 
There is great variety in how these methods are implemented. By 
way of example, it is worth reviewing several instruments used by 
U.S. agencies to control prices and production. Agencies developed 
case-by-case procedures for analyzing whether or not individual 
10
 See, Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1982) at 37. 
11
 Id. at 37. 
12
 A classic rationale for public ownership is that public 
ownership permits or entities to pursue a mix of profit and other 
factors that maximize social as opposed to private benefits that 
would not otherwise be achieved under private ownership. See, 
OECD, supra note 3. 
8 
pricing schedules were "just and reasonable" or whether 
production occurs in ways that "protect the health of persons." 
Regulatory schemes have been developed and embodied in statute that 
seek to bring uniformity of results across industries. For 
example, Professor MacAvoy argues that "state and national statues 
establishing agencies to control prices for electricity, gas and 
telephone services all contain requirements for preventing high, 
unstable and discriminatory prices."14 
Another factor that has significantly shaped the regulatory process 
in the U.S. is the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) . In its 
early days, a main feature of the APA was its requirement that 
regulated companies have recourse to due process through judicial 
review of agency action.15 Over time the scope of this review has 
broadened to examine whether agency decisions are reasonable in 
light of the goals of the statute. In the 1970s, the APA came to 
be used by activists as a sword to ensure that their interests in 
"agency decision making were given fair representation."16 And 
in the 1980s, the APA was used to challenge the elimination of 
entire programs of agencies.17 
13
 P. MacAvoy, supra note 4 at 21. 
14
 Id. at 21. 
15
 Id. at 22. 
16
 Patricia M. Wald, "The Realpolitik of Judicial Review in 
a Deregulation Era", Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 




The OECD also identifies competition policy enforcement as an 
economy-wide method of regulation. Competition (or antitrust) 
enforcement can be used in tandem with economic deregulation and 
regulatory reform and for this reason is properly an area heavily 
emphasized by the OECD. Yet, to characterize it as simply another 
form of regulation is to misconstrue the fundamental goals and 
instruments of competition policy enforcement. 
Competition enforcement seeks to create or maintain a competitive 
marketplace rather than to replicate the results of competition and 
correct for defects in competitive markets. Antitrust laws, 
therefore, act "negatively, through a few highly general provisions 
prohibiting certain forms of conduct. They do not affirmatively 
order firms to behave in specified ways; for the most part they 
tell private firms what not to do... Only rarely do the antitrust 
enforcement agencies create the detailed web of affirmative legal 
obligations that characterizes classical regulation."18 
Antitrust laws are premised on the assumption that competitive 
market environments will achieve more efficient allocation of 
resources, greater product efficiency, and increased innovation. It 
seeks to achieve these ends by removing private impediments to 
competition19. As Stephen Breyer argues, 
18
 S. Breyer, supra note 10 at 157. 
19
 Id. at 158. 
10 
where this assumption holds true, antitrust would ordinarily 
seem the appropriate form for government intervention to take. 
Where the assumption fails, one finds the demand for other 
modes of governmental intervention, such as classical 
regulation. Viewed in this way, regulation is an alternative 
to antitrust, necessary when antitrust cannot successfully 
maintain a workably competitive marketplace or when such a 
marketplace is inadequate due to some other serious defect.20 
C. Factors Influencing Economic Deregulation and Regulatory 
Reform 
A fairly recent report by the OECD issued upon completion of an 
extensive survey and analysis of regulatory reform and 
deregulation, identified five major factors as stimulating domestic 
reform efforts within member countries: regulatory failure; poor 
performance; labor market effects; budgetary considerations; and 
technological change. 
With respect to regulatory failure, the OECD suggests that in many 
countries interventions, once intended to correct market failures, 
have produced adverse and often unintended consequences for the 
achievement of efficiency. Since regulation was designed to serve 
a variety of public interest concerns unrelated to economic 
efficiency, such regulation in numerous instances distorted the 
price mechanism and led to uneconomic activities and outcomes. 
Excessive costs, high prices, pricing rules that made 
administrative sense but not economic sense, excessive quality 
standards in relation to what consumers required and were willing 
to pay for, and a variety of other inefficiencies have all been 
identified as important motives for deregulation and regulatory 
20
 Id. at 158. 
11 
reform.21 
Critics of regulation in the U.S. have argued that the growth of 
regulation in the U.S. has brought on a variety of ills such as 
"high cost; ineffectiveness and waste, procedural unfairness, 
complexity and delay; unresponsiveness to democratic control; and 
the inherent unpredictability of the end result."22 
The OECD report does not try to sort out the domestic factors that 
can lead to such outcomes. Professor Paul MacAvoy identifies two 
main "culprits" as causing serious regulatory problems in the 
United States. The first of these, he argues, is the tendency of 
regulation through legislation to serve too many and too diverse 
interest groups, thereby producing distortions in the regulatory 
process and in pricing and structure. The second culprit is the 
limited managerial competence to be found in the regulatory 
agencies. He also notes that approaches to regulation that may have 
made sense under one set of market conditions often proved to make 
far less or no sense under different conditions.23 Overall, 
21
 Regulation has been justified in the name of market 
failure, which is itself not a static concept. As the OECD points 
out, changes in technologies and market conditions have led to 
re-thinking of the nature and extent of market failure. See, 
OECD, supra note 3 at 20. 
22
 S. Breyer, supra note 10 at 4. 
23
 For example, Professor MacAvoy points to the use of 
ceilings on prices in line with previous period costs of service. 
He argues that" these worked well when industry demands increased 
and costs decreased each year from larger scale. But when 
inflation was accompanied by recession, so that costs increased 
12 
imperfect procedures probably have "prevented regulation from 
working in the interests of consumers, by reducing production 
across the regulated industries and thereby reducing the rate of 
growth of the economy." 24 
A second and related motivation for deregulation and reform, as 
noted by the OECD, is the perception that regulated sectors have 
performed poorly. Comparisons with deregulated sectors in other 
countries, or between regulated and deregulated regions within 
countries, have accentuated this recognition. 
Regulation itself has been identified as contributing if not 
producing such poor performance--e.g., by skewing incentive 
structures through low salaries; allowing political interference in 
decision making; imposing constraints on diversification; and 
limiting public and regulated enterprises from introducing new 
technologies or management methods. 
Third, the OECD notes that labor market problems have also had 
significant effects on the movement toward regulatory reform. The 
performance of public sector entities deteriorated as union 
pressures brought pay increases in excess of productivity 
rapidly, this same method had quite the opposite effect. Prices 
lagged behind costs so long as costs increased continuously. The 
operating practices of the agencies by themselves generated 
adverse price and production behavior". P. MacAvoy, supra note 4 
at 4. 
24
 Id. at 4. 
13 
improvements. In the U.K. for example, the OECD notes that support 
to public sector entities became a disguised employment subsidy 
with adverse consequences for the specific sector and the overall 
health of the economy as a whole.25 
A fourth factor exerting a strong influence on deregulation and 
regulatory reform has been budgetary. Privatization can provide a 
direct cash infusion to public coffers, and other forms of 
regulatory reform can bring substantial cost savings. Both the 
United Kingdom and Japan are cited as countries where this 
motivation featured prominently in the privatization that took 
place. In the U.K. context, the instruments chosen to implement 
privatization have included transfer of share ownership from public 
to private sectors, subcontracting and curtailment of statutory 
monopoly powers.26 
The OECD does not try to weigh the relative importance of any given 
factor in a country's decision to embark on a program of reform. 
Expert opinion often divides on this point.27 
25
 OECD, supra note 3. 
26
 See, Colin Harbury, "Privatization: British Style", 
Journal of Behavioral Economics, Vol 18, No 4 , 1990 at 268. 
27In the U.K., for example, Sir Alan Walters, former 
personal economic adviser to Prime Minister Thatcher, has argued 
that the two principal motives for economic deregulation and in 
particular the extensive privatization programs of the Thatcher 
government include: (1) the desire to reduce the politicization 
of economic decision making, particularly in state run companies, 
and (2) the 
desire to increase net wealth through improvements in economic 
14 
II. Deregulation in the United States 
Political scientists Martha Derthwick and Paul Quirk, in their 
extensive analysis of regulatory reform in the U.S. airline, 
trucking, and telecommunications industries, argue that five 
general factors made deregulation possible in the United States--
albeit to varying degrees, and with a wide range of consequences 
for consumers, workers, and affected industries.28 We shall 
briefly review their conclusions and then related them to 
deregulation in Japan. 
First, the authors argue that elite opinion in the U.S. converged 
in support of reform. In particular, they suggest that deregulation 
would not have occurred in the United States had it not been for 
the theoretical and applied work of economists that provided 
compelling evidence that much economic regulation in fundamentally 
efficiency of enterprises. Professor's Vickers and Yarrow, on 
the other hand, argue that the momentum of privatization policies 
were initially influenced by dissatisfaction with the performance 
of publicly-owned industries, later by short-term budgetary 
considerations, and finally by share ownership and distributional 
objectives. The distributional objective--i.e., gaining political 
advantage by means of transfers of wealth-- was far more 
important in a latter period of privatization--e.g., between 
1987-93. Sir Ian MacGregor, a key figure in privatization in the 
U.K., stresses that privatization was driven by ideological 
coupled with a growing recognition of privatization's collateral 
advantages--namely, the populist notion of widening share 
ownership. See, Privatization and State-Owned Enterprises, Paul 
MacAvoy, W.T. Stanbury, George Yarrow, Richard Zeckhauser, ed. 
(Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989). 
28
 See, Martha Derthwick & Paul J. Quirk, The Politics of 
Deregulation,(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985). 
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competitive markets had large costs without the associated 
benefits .29 
This academic literature is well known and need not be fully 
amplified here. Suffice it to say, however, that numerous sectoral 
and theoretical writings of what might be called private-interest 
theories all but superseded the public-interest theory of 
regulation that had dominated the thinking of earlier decades. 
Writings in this vein offered a far more negative view of 
regulation and regulators' behavior.30 This literature challenged 
the public-interest theory by focusing on regulators' behavior, 
which not only showed the sources of inefficiency but other 
structural features that kept such inefficiencies in check.31 
29
 Where regulation was not anticompetitive (e.g., it did 
not restrict minimum prices of goods and services), Derthwick & 
Quirk argue that elite opinion did not similarly converge. They 
cite natural gas as one case in point. Id. at 23 8. 
30
 See, for example, Harvey Verch and Leland Johnson, 
"Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint," Amer. Econ. 
Rev.,. Dec. 1962, pp. 1052-69. 
31
 See, George Stigler, supra note 1; Sam Peltzman "Toward a 
More General Theory of Regulation", J. Law Econ., August 1976, 19 
(2); Clifford Winston, " Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning 
for Microeconomists" Journal of Econ. Lit. Vol XXXI, Sept 1993 at 
1263-1289. Gary Becker, "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure 
Groups for Political Influence", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
vol. 98 (August 1983). Peltzman argues, for example, that the 
lessons of this theoretical literature are that well organized 
groups, (frequently comprised of producers), tend to benefit more 
from regulation than broad diffuse groups (such as consumer 
groups) and that regulatory policy will strive to preserve a 
politically 
optimal distribution of rents across this coalition of well-
organized groups. But "because the political payoff to regulation 
arises from distributing wealth, the regulatory process is 
16 
These theoretical writings, argued that social welfare would be 
enhanced by deregulation because the gains to those who support 
deregulation and to the wider society were likely to be larger than 
the losses to those benefitting from regulation.32 
Derthwick and Quirk go on to make the important point that the 
soundness of the empirical contributions of economist would not 
have been sufficient to propel the policy process toward reforms, 
had influential policy research institutions and government 
agencies not housed reform-oriented policymakers. This may be 
another way of saying that individuals and institutions in favor of 
regulatory reform were on hand and could be and were mobilized in 
support of it. 
The concept of economic deregulation and regulatory reform has 
proved politically malleable and attractive to U.S. political 
leadership. Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan, in seeking to 
sensitive to deadweight losses. Policies that reduce the total 
wealth available for distribution will be avoided, because, other 
things being equal, they reduce the political payoff from 
regulation." See, Sam Peltzman, " The Economic Theory of 
Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation", in Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity. Martin Baily and Clifford Winston, ed. 
(Washington D.C. Brookings Institution 1989) at 12. 
32
 See C. Winston, Id. In this excellent survey article, Dr. 
Winston identifies the variety of economic inefficiencies created 
by regulation that economists predicted would be reduced or 
eliminated by deregulation. Sam Peltzman, in reviewing 
deregulation, argues that the U.S. deregulatory experience with 
railways is quite consistent with the theoretical predictions of 
economists. Trucking deregulation, however, was a "resounding 
defeat" Id. 
17 
address inflation and respond to public dissatisfaction with 
government intervention, embraced the policy prescriptions of 
experts and academics. In this sense, deregulation and 
procompetitive reform was a national rather than a partisan 
movement, it that found broad political appeal across the political 
spectrum. 
Liberals supportive of deregulation and regulatory reform were able 
to stress the consumer gains to be achieved through lower prices 
and by putting an end to what could be characterized as government 
coddling of business interests. Conservatives could embrace reform 
in the name of reducing the excessive and intrusive burden of 
government regulation in private markets. These different elements 
of elite opinion converged in favor of reform. 
A second important variable identified by Derthwick and Quirk was 
the proactive exercise of leadership by policymakers. The 
inference drawn is that leaders can in fact be mobilized to serve 
broad and often diffuse interests, instead of narrow and particular 
ones, if the issues are "ripe" and fit well with the leaders 
political agenda, if the benefits are perceived as greater than the 
risks, and if the steps that are taken prove popular or have a 
positive demonstration effect. 
Third, Congress did not have to act in order for a considerable 
amount of deregulation to occur. This is owing to the independence 
18 
of existing regulatory commissions and the interplay between those 
commissions and the courts. The former are endowed with broad 
powers to act, and occasionally have had strong and independent 
leadership. Regulatory commissions have, on occasion, served as a 
spur to Congress. In addition, U.S. courts have provided a forum 
for review of agency actions and have, particularly through 
antitrust litigation obliged industry restructuring--e.g., in 
telecommunications. 
A fourth variable emphasized by the authors is that in some 
instances Congress did take legislative measures and in several 
instances affected industries proven unable to effectively 
countervail the confluence of factors we have just identified. 
In sum, areas that experienced extensive deregulation in the United 
States benefitted from a number of conditions: reform proposals 
were firmly rooted in empirical analysis; amenable to political 
manipulation; buttressed by institutional mechanisms that provided 
reformers with the requisite independence to take action 
independent of legislative action; and came up against interests 
that at times were badly organized or otherwise unable to mount an 
effective counter-offensive. 
Airlines deregulation often is cited as one sectoral example where 
all of these factors together. Certainly this is a sector there was 
comprehensive deregulation and even the elimination of the 
19 
oversight agency. Specifically, in the late 1970s the CAB 
abandoned regulation by suspending scheduling and entry 
restrictions, and allowed fare flexibility between city pairings.33 
The passage of the Airline Deregulation Act eliminated the CAB. By 
that time, controls in the agency had effectively been abolished 
from within.34 
How and why did this come about? Stephen Breyer, now a Justice on 
the U.S. Supreme Court, in his assessment of airline deregulation 
in the United States, places particular emphasis on the role played 
by Congressional hearings. These were able to mobilize the 
political support needed to implement those reforms long seen as 
desirable by economists. The following are the general conclusions 
Breyer draws from his experience with airline deregulation in the 
late 1970s. 
First, in order for reform to be implemented, interested parties 
must possess detailed knowledge of the changes that are needed and 
desirable. Second, reformers must come up with a real-world 
alternative to existing forms of regulation as well as a practical 
transition plan. Third, they must organize and deal with political 
33
 P. MacAvoy, supra note 4 at 112. 
34
 This had, in the view of some analysts, provided enough 
experimentation with the open market process "to establish that 
service would improve, so that congressmen voting for the 
elimination of the CAB would not later be blamed for market 
instability, monopoly or whatever". Id. at 112 
20 
factors.35 
With respect to the last point, political leaders must be persuaded 
to devote the necessary time and effort to organizing a political 
coalition intent upon reform. Breyer argues that reform can be 
accomplished if the issue becomes visible politically. 
Congressional hearings are one means of making the issue "ripe" for 
political action. But as the issue becomes visible it must be 
characterized in such a fashion that it will strengthen the 
political alliance in its favor. Coalitions to implement reform 
must also be formed within the executive and the legislative 
branches,36 as well as among outside interests. Advocates of reform 
must put forward a practical and fair plan that maps out the 
transition from the regulated regime to the new system. 
In the context of airline deregulation, the Subcommittee on 
Administrative Practice and Procedure, chaired by Senator Kennedy, 
was the Congressional group that took the lead in pushing for 
airline deregulation. It did so, Justice Breyer argues, because 
political benefits would accrue to the Committee if it undertook an 
investigation and hearings in that area. Academics already had 
offered extensive evidence that the airline industry was an 
instance of regulatory failure, and that reform would lead to lower 
prices while maintaining service. 
35
 S. Breyer, supra note 10 at 318. 
36
 Id. at 318-321. 
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For example, Breyer argues that there was ample evidence that the 
market defect that was the original justification for airline 
regulation (namely, excessive competition) did not exist. Instead, 
the markets were in fact "workably competitive".37 Reformers were 
able to put forward strong arguments that the industry could 
support competition and that to the extent there were problems 
(e.g., excessive competition), other policy instruments or 
oversight agencies could address them. For instance, antitrust law 
could deal with predatory pricing, and the FAA could deal with 
safety related matters. 
Politically, deregulation and regulatory reform gave the Kennedy 
Committee a specific mission but also a wider theme that permitted 
it to review other sectors and agencies. Through hearings the 
Committee could gain develop the expertise that would enable it to 
play a role in other economic regulatory areas.38 Thus an ambitious 
committee chairman was able to gain considerable prominence as a 
policymaker by taking on this regulatory reform agenda. 
Further, Justice Breyer argues that the Committee was effective 
because it did its homework in an exhaustive fashion. It went 
through a painstaking preparatory stage of identifying issues and 
substantive arguments. The Committee drew upon extensive existing 
academic studies showing that the Civil Aeronautics Board's 
37Id. 
38
 Id. at 323. 
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regulation of prices and entry had led to high prices, 
overcapacity, and inefficiency.39 The Committee then forged 
alliances within the executive branch and elsewhere, collected 
information and proposals, and scheduled extensive public hearings. 
These hearings then served the multiple functions of: obliging 
executive agencies and other interests to take a stand on issues 
and thereby serve as catalysts for change; marshaling existing 
arguments and information both in favor of and opposed to 
regulatory reform; and serving as excellent "theater" to propel the 
process of reform forward.40 
Public hearings had the added benefit of showing up the 
inefficiencies of the existing regulatory scheme. They brought a 
number of government agencies to the table to speak up in favor of 
reform because they believed that the existing system was 
inefficient and "wrong".41 This, Breyer claims, had a "powerful" 
effect in convincing Congress to act to change the system.42 The 
coalition in support of reform consisted not only of those with an 
39
 Breyer argues that high fares was basically a problem of 
low load factors, which itself reflect excessive scheduling which 
in turn derived from CAB action that inhibited price competition. 
He also argues that regulation had closed the industry to 
newcomers; had guaranteed relatively stable market shares to 
incumbents; and had weakened drives to efficiency. CAB 
procedures also violated "accepted administrative norms of 
efficiency, fairness or propriety". Id. 
40




 Id. at 321. 
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economic interest in any given outcome, but also groups holding 
ideological views that corresponded with the position on issues 
that had made the issue a politically visible one. 
While Justice Breyer sees the exhaustive work of the Kennedy 
Committee as the central driver, others have placed relatively more 
emphasis on the role of executive and presidential action--even in 
the case of airline deregulation. James Miller, for example, 
argues that presidential sponsorship is crucial to deregulation 
given the basic political economy of economic regulation. Drawing 
on the traditional paradigm of the iron triangle, Miller has argued 
that typically 
an agency is captured by its industry and protects it from the 
ravages of competition. The agency is nurtured by the 
committees on Capital Hill who oversee its programs and its 
budget. The industry is very attentive to the Senators and 
Representatives on those critical committees...What Hill 
committee will say, 'we have been meddling needlessly where 
free markets would do better?'....Moreover, when technological 
change or an increase in the geographic expense of competition 
puts stress on a regulatory system, the agency's usual 
response is to expand its domain. 3 
Given this reality, Miller argues that the politics of regulation 
makes presidential initiative critical44. He does point to the 
43
 James C. Miller III, "The Administration's Role in 
Deregulation", 55 Antitrust L.J. 199 (1986) 
44
 Miller cites some five ways that leadership can be 
exercised. First, by direct action--e.g., through an executive 
order which is the method employed by President Reagan in oil. 
Second, through proposed legislation. Third, through the power of 
appointment to regulatory agencies--which was the case in 
airlines. Fourth through legal intervention--e.g., a lawsuit--
such as was the 
case in telecommunications. Fifth, by providing the necessary 
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Congressional hearings on airline deregulation as being a 
"watershed event," but argues that absent the support of presidents 
Ford and Carter and certain appointees to the chairmanship of the 
CAB, deregulation would not have occurred.45 
III. Deregulation in Japan 
Thus far we have discussed various rationales for regulation and 
deregulation, identified basic factors driving deregulation, and 
reviewed the political economy of economic deregulation in the 
United States. We now turn to an examination of the political 
economy of economic deregulation in Japan context, historically and 
at the current time. Where useful, there will be comparisons made 
with the U.S. experience. 
A. The Early Postwar Years: The Government's Visible Hand 
It is worth recalling that an overriding goal of Japan's government 
officials in the early postwar years was to catch up to Western 
countries through policies that promoted high levels of savings and 
investment generally and high levels of investment in certain 
supporting analysis--e.g., the commissioning of studies on 
deregulation by President Ford. Id. 
45
 Indeed, Miller quips that not only does deregulation 
require the cooperation and support of the President, but to 
assure success, you may need a whole host of them. Id. 
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specific sectors. In the immediate postwar years the government 
had powerful instruments available to it to help achieve these 
goals--e.g., direct administrative controls over foreign exchange 
transactions and considerable formal and informal influence over 
the direction of investment. 
Two legal instruments that provided such direct controls over 
economic activity were the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade 
Control Law (FECL) and the Foreign Investment Law (FIL) . Most laws 
in Japan have been written as to give wide latitude to bureaucratic 
discretion; these two laws are cases in point. In effect, 
government officials could and would make decisions on the basis of 
their own interpretations of national interest.46 Protection from 
import competition, based on theories of infant industry 
protection, routinely was applied, and until the early 1970s, was 
either explicitly or implicitly tolerated by other advanced 
industrial countries. By the 1970's, many of the specific controls 
over economic activity had been weakened or eliminated, and others 
were under a variety of cross-pressures that led to further 
adjustment. 
46
 Thomas Pepper, Merit E. Janow and Jimmy Wheeler, The 
Competition: Dealing with Japan (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1985). Lawrence Krause and Sueo Sekiguchi describe MITI's role in 
those days in the following manner: "The MITI had to approve, on 
a case by case basis, any foreign trade transaction that was not 
to be based on the standard method of payment. Thus, the MITI 
became intimately involved in business decisions from the 
beginning and was able to evolve into a very powerful ministry". 
Lawrence B. Kraus and Sueo Sekiguchi, "Japan and the World 
Economy" in Asia's New Giant, ed. Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky 
(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976), at 411. 
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B. Forces for Change 
To the extent that regulatory reform and economic deregulation has 
occurred in Japan, it has arguably been driven by the interplay of 
at least four factors. First, the pluralization of interests within 
Japanese society. Second, the emergence of domestic and 
international market-based pressures for regulatory change, notably 
the important role of technological advances. Third, external 
political pressures for change, and fourth, the perceived fiscal 
necessity to reduce public expenditures, which arose in part from 
the government's inability to win legislative approval for revenue 
generating tax reforms.47 
Let me briefly examine each of these elements. 
1. Pluralization of Interests 
It is hardly surprising that economic growth and prosperity 
gradually reduced the dependence of commercial and industrial 
enterprises on economic bureaucracies. Earlier degrees of 
government control over economic activity became increasingly 
inappropriate (and unwelcome) given the level of prosperity 
attained. In some areas, regulatory adjustments were necessitated 
by Japan's signing on to international agreements and organizations 
47
 John Haley, "The Context and Content of Regulatory Change 
in Japan", in The Age of Regulatory Reform, Kenneth Button and 
Dennis Swamm, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) at 
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such as the GATT and the OECD. In response, government agencies 
reduced some of their controls over capital flows and investment, 
and adjusted some of their industrial support measures. Phased 
liberalization, usually of a minimalist nature, gradually was 
introduced, and this was reflected in adjustments to the FECL and 
FIL and in other laws and regulations. 
In addition, as per capita income increased, new domestic goals 
emerged alongside that of economic growth--e.g., protection of the 
environment, better health-care facilities for the aged, and 
increased leisure time. One need only recall the "kutabare GNP" 
("Down with GNP") campaign, and the sarcastic slogan "Gross 
National Pollution" that became a catchword in the early 1970s to 
be reminded of the public criticism that arose in Japan over the 
government's perceived single-minded pursuit of industrial 
development objectives. 
The 1980's witnessed a further proliferation of diverse economic 
interest groups, both inside and outside the government, competing 
for resources and calling for further modifications to various 
aspects of regulatory control. Developments in the 
telecommunications sector, which are discussed below, offer a good 
illustration of the growth of multiple and competing interests. 
However, tensions erupted in other sectors of the economy subject 
to regulatory control. For example, strains brought on by 
regulation were showing up in the petroleum refining and 
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petrochemical industries in the mid-1980's. 
Under the Petroleum Industry Law (PIL), which was administered by 
MITI, domestic petrochemical industries were obliged to purchase 
naphtha from domestic petroleum firms. When domestic naphtha prices 
rose to levels substantially above those found in world markets, 
domestic petrochemical firms threatened to circumvent the existing 
regulatory scheme and purchase imported naphtha directly. 
Eventually, MITI and industry reached an accommodation whereby the 
petrochemical firms were permitted to purchase imported naphtha but 
were required to allow the petroleum firms to be the import agents. 
MITI's specialized agency responsible for administering the PIL 
retained the authority to regulate domestic prices but agreed to 
hold the price of naphtha down to the price of imported product.48 
2. Market Pressures 
In Japan as elsewhere, market-based pressures have been an 
important agent of regulatory change. Although regulatory reform 
generally has tended to lag behind market and technological change, 
regulatory adjustments have occurred. Let us examine 
telecommunications in somewhat more detail. 
For more details on this case see: T. Pepper, M. Janow & 
J. Wheeler, supra note 46, and Frank K. Upham, "The Legal 
Framework of Japan's Declining Industries Policy:The Problem of 
Transparency in Administrative Processes", 27 Harv. Int'1 L.J. 
425 (1986) . 
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After World War II, several public corporations were created--NTT, 
Japan National Railways (JNR) and the Japan Monopoly Corporation 
(JMC) . NTT was established as a public corporation having a 
monopoly in domestic telecommunications. It was under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) 
and MPT identified those areas of business within which NTT could 
operate, but did not regulate its activities as strictly as did the 
FCC in the United States. Much of NTT's top management came from 
MPT. As was the case in Europe and elsewhere, this was seen as a 
natural monopoly.49 
The early mission of NTT was to establish a national system and 
install telephones. Telephone subscribers, both business and 
residential, were required to pay a substantial one-time fee in the 
form of "telephone bonds" to establish service; sale of these bonds 
was used then to finance the expansion of the system. Installation 
charges were set at a higher rate for residences than for 
businesses on the grounds that a home telephone was a luxury, 
whereas calls from the office contributed more to overall economic 
49
 This is in contrast to JNR, which had a nationwide 
network but faced competition from other modes of transport such 
as road transportation, private railways and airlines. Although 
we do not discuss privatization of JNR in this paper, it is worth 
noting that some scholars have identified the following internal 
problems as driving the restructuring of JNR: excessive 
government involvement, unclear management responsibility, 
limitations on the pursuit of varied and dynamic business 
activities and "abnormal" labor-management relations. See, Masami 
Sakita, "Restructuring of the Japanese National Railways: Review 
and Analysis", Transportation Quarterly. Vol XLIII, No 1 January 
1989 at 30. 
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development. By the end of the 1970s, a national infrastructure 
was in place. 
In the 1980-1985 period, when conducting research on Japan's 
industrial development policies, I interviewed Japanese government 
officials in several ministries as to the active debate then 
underway on the need for regulatory reform of NTT driven by the 
growth of data communications. The fusion of computers and 
communications was producing strong pressures for market entry from 
the domestic and foreign computer firms. 
These technological developments also produced and exacerbated 
interministerial conflict. At various points in the 1980s, for 
example, MITI and MPT have been engaged in intense struggles over 
oversight responsibility for the information-processing industry. 
In the early 1980s, with increased demand for Value-Added Network 
Services (VANS), MPT proposed a VANS law that would allow private 
companies to supply services to third parties. 
This bill engendered fierce struggles between MPT and MITI. MPT was 
keen on regulating value-added network services in the apparent 
belief that such regulation was needed to avoid "confusion" in the 
marketplace. MITI, drawing from its experiences fostering a 
domestic computer industry comprised of a number of competing 
firms, argued that restrictions would interfere with the 
50
 T. Pepper, M. Janow and J. Wheeler, supra note 46. 
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development of the information-processing industry--including 
computers which were under its jurisdiction51. The resulting draft 
law ultimately was set aside. Instead, various amendments to the 
Public Telecommunications Law were enacted liberalizing third party 
use of leased circuits. Thereafter various companies entered the 
market for value-added services. The reasons for liberalization of 
VANs as well as the restructuring of NTT and telecommunications 
more broadly appear to have been both competitive and budgetary. 
A competition-based argument often advanced states that it was 
NTT's monopoly position in the area of data transmission that had 
led to Japan's falling behind the United States in this aspect of 
information processing. Further, that innovation was impeded by 
the regulatory environment and by the overly close ties between NTT 
personnel and manufacturing firms. This type of argument arose in 
part since the original rationale for Japan's monopoly structure 
had eroded--installation of telephone lines had largely been 
I recall the furor that developed in late 1983 when MPT 
revealed draft legislation on VANS that barred firms with 50 
percent or more foreign ownership for offering nationwide, large 
scale data networks. At the time, there were hints that such 
measures were needed to prevent IBM Japan and ATT from taking 
over a still developing market in Japan. US officials and 
business representatives objected strongly and argued that the 
proposed legislation was discriminatory and protectionist. 
Interestingly, MITI also supported that position arguing that 
enhanced services should be considered outside the scope of 
existing regulations on basic transmission services. MPT took the 
opposite approach, which was consistent with its own desire to 
retain control over as much of the industry as possible. For a 
more detailed elaboration of these developments See, Pepper, 
Janow and Wheeler, supra note 46. 
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achieved on a national basis, and there was a tremendous growth in 
demand for leased circuits capable of handling new data 
transmissions. 
A budgetary rationale for NTT deregulation also featured 
prominently. Government debt in Japan had grown from 9.2 percent of 
GNP in 1974 to 41.2 percent in 1982.52 In 1982, the Ad Hoc 
Commission on Administrative Reform proposed that NTT be 
reorganized into private companies to raise capital to reduce debt. 
It also argued that the time had come for Japan to allow more 
competition in telecommunications, if only because it had no choice 
if it wanted to keep up with developments in international 
markets .53 
International political pressure also drove regulatory reform in 
telecommunications. NTT procurement practices, MPT's standards, 
certification and testing procedures, its regulation of mobile 
communications such as cellular telephone and third party radio, 
have all been sources of bilateral U.S.-Japan trade friction. 
With respect to procurement, and in contrast to AT&T, NTT did not 
manufacture its own equipment. Rather, until the late 1970s NTT 
procured only from domestic electronics companies. NTT was 
52
 J. Haley, supra note 47 at 134. 
53The Commission recommended the privatization of the Japan 
National Railways, NTT and the Japan Monopoly Corporation as 
necessary cost-saving reforms. 
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practically a domestic monopsonist for such equipment, and its 
procurements from domestic sources were critical to the development 
of domestic electronics firms. In the late 1970s, international, 
especially U.S., criticism of NTT procurement practices became 
acute. As one expert notes, "cost-effective, comparable if not 
superior equipment was routinely frozen out by narrow 
specifications that had little if anything to do with actual 
performance"54 Foreign trade pressures eventually led to 
substantial revisions of NTT's procurement procedures and 
practices.55 
Product standards and testing were another subject of bitter 
bilateral trade tension. In the so-called MOSS talks, the U.S. 
Government requested that Japan simplify its procedures for 
approving certain equipment, and provide greater entry for 
competitive U.S. products. Some modifications in standards ensued-
-e.g. self-certification for value added networks, changes in 
technical standards, and modifications in standard setting 
procedures. 
Legislation for the privatization of NTT and the JMC was enacted in 
Tsuruhiko Nambu, "A Comparison of Deregulation Policies" 
in E. Noam, Seisuke Komatsuzaki, Douglas A. Conn, 
Telecommunications in the Pacific Basis: An Evolutionary Approach 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 42. 
55
 See for example the Government Procurement Code 
negotiations that occurred in the context of the Tokyo Round, and 
the bilateral U.S.-Japan NTT procurement agreements. 
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1984 and became effective in 1985. Telecommunications were subject 
to the resulting Telecommunications Business Law (TBL), and NTT was 
regulated under the NTT Corporation Law. 
NTT nominally became a private company, although more than 51 
percent of its shares were held by the government, its budget was 
still subject to Diet approval, many MPT officials were still on 
its staff, and it was required to provide universal service. NTT 
was permitted to provide both local and long distance services but 
it was prohibited from entering the international market, which 
remained under KDD's jurisdiction. In addition, NTT initially was 
not permitted to change its tariff structure. 
The revised TBL provided for new entry in the categories it 
established. Service providers were divided into Type I and Type 
II carriers. Type I, primary carriers, own their own 
telecommunications facilities and were able to supply both basic 
telephone services as well as data processing and value-added 
network services. Three firms were permitted to enter into the long 
distance market: Daini Denden (DDI), Japan Telecom (JT), and 
Teleway Japan. Under the TBL, Type I carriers are subject to 
extensive MPT regulatory oversight. MPT controlled both market 
entry and exit and regulated permissible rates of return. 
According to some experts, MPT's regulatory approach had a number 
of adverse effects. Since NTT was not permitted to lower its tariff 
structure, the three new common carrier companies have put NTT 
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under competitive pressure in the long distance market by selling 
below NTT. At the same time NTT was obliged to continue providing 
universal service and local service at a loss. Initially, rate 
rebalancing or access charges were not permitted. Limitations on 
the number of new entrants in this market coupled with constraints 
on NTT's tariff structure also had the effect of limiting the 
competitive pressures faced by the new common carriers (NCC).36 
Type II carriers lease lines from Type I carriers, and under the 
TBL are permitted to supply data processing and other enhanced 
services with less MPT oversight than Type I carriers, although 
Type II carriers are subject to certain filing requirements. 
Numerous firms, foreign and domestic, have entered into this 
market. 
In the late 1980's, yet another area of bilateral tension developed 
in the telecommunications sector. This time the dispute centered 
on the effect of the revised regulatory scheme as it affected 
foreign access to Japan's still nascent third party radio and 
cellular telephone market. As noted, under the revised law NTT was 
able to offer services nation wide but several new common carriers 
entered the market. IDO, a subsidiary of Teleway Japan, used NTT 
cellular technology. A second carrier, DDI, used Motorola 
technology. Both of these were subject to MPT review and MPT 
56
 See, Susumu Nagai, "Japan: Technology and Domestic 
Deregulation", supra note 54 in E. Noam, et. al. 
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imposed territorial restrictions on the services that each could 
offer. IDO was assigned the Tokyo metropolitan area, which was an 
immensely profitable area, while DDI was awarded the Kansai area, 
a much smaller market. This regulatory arrangement meant that NTT 
protocol applied to the Tokyo-Nagoya corridor while NTT and 
Motorola competed everywhere else. Motorola, feeling that this 
scheme severely limited its access to the Japanese market, pressed 
the U.S. Government to seek a negotiated solution with the 
Government of Japan. Certain new provisions in the 1988 Trade Act 
were invoked to trigger a trade action equivalent in nature to a 
section 3 01 investigation. Difficult bilateral negotiations ensued 
and an agreement was ultimately reached in 1990. 
In that agreement, MPT agreed to certain deregulatory measures. 
Specifically, it agreed to reallocate spectrum so as to allow 
Motorola to compete in the Tokyo-Nagoya area. However, in keeping 
with MPT's desire to keep the market players limited to two 
companies, instead of letting DDI into this profitable market 
segment, MPT obliged Motorola and IDO to work together. MPT also 
obliged IDO to spend considerable funds to build the necessary 
infrastructure to handle the Motorola system. After considerable 
delay, which Motorola claims substantially reduced their 
indisputable technological lead in this product market, Motorola 
gained access to the Tokyo area market. 
MPT's revised regulatory arrangement put IDO in the peculiar 
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competitive position of being obliged to operate a system that 
directly competed with its already functioning system. It was not 
hardly surprisingly that several years later Motorola complained to 
the U.S. government that the arrangement was not resulting in the 
access to the market envisioned by the earlier arrangement. The 
subsequent bilateral government-to-government negotiations were 
particularly acrimonious. 57 In 1994, the two governments 
eventually reached agreement: MPT agreed to provide greater 
spectrum for Motorola-type cellular systems and used its regulatory 
powers to pressure IDO to provide greater deployment, operation and 
promotion of the Motorola type system.58 
While the telecommunications sector has seen substantial 
deregulation, the process of NTT's "privatization", and more 
generally Japan's approach to the reform of its telecommunications 
regime has generated and continues to generate domestic and 
international controversy. The U.S. government, continues to urge 
MPT to introduce more transparency in its regulatory practices 
(e.g., by permitting formal comment on regulations before they 
become final decisions) and to ensure equal access to its 
57
 This dispute was particularly bitter because MPT had 
begun to promote a digital system while Motorola's analog system 
was getting fully operational. Many in Japan argued, as a result, 
that the U.S. Government had taken up a single company issue and 
that Motorola was obliging Japan to use technology that was on 
the way out. 
58
 For more detail on these trade disputes see, Laura 
D'Andrea Tyson, "Who's Bashing Whom", (Washington D.C.: H E , 
1992) chapter 3. 
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negotiated local network interconnection regime. 
Just this month the Telecommunications Council has issued a report 
recommending a break-up of NTT. There are reports that the 
Council's recommendations are opposed by NTT itself, and did not 
even receive the unanimous support of Council members. It has, 
however, been reported to have the supported of Keidanren and MPT, 
although even this last point is far from certain. Career MPT 
officials have been quoted in Japanese and foreign papers to the 
effect that Japan's telecommunications policy lags that of the U.S. 
and that reform is needed to bring it up with the rest of the 
world.59 The current Minister of MPT, a Social Democrat, reportedly 
has given only lukewarm support to the plan while the SDP has 
opposed the breakup.60 
Why has this transpired? Press reports indicate that there is a 
widespread feeling that NTT's overwhelming share of the local 
network has stifled competition, kept telecom prices high, unduly 
restricted the offering of new services, and hindered Japan's entry 
into the advanced information age.61 The Council has recommended 
59
 Wall Street Journal, March 1, 1996. 
60
 Wall Street Journal, March 1, 1996, A10. 
61
 See, Financial Times, March 1, 1996. A recent report by 
JEI states that although three common carriers entered the market 
after the deregulation of 1985, by the end of FY 1994 they had 
obtained less than one-third of the market, mainly because NTT 
still monopolizes the local connections through which long 
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that NTT be split into a single long-distance company and two 
regional companies, and that the long distance company offer 
international and local telephone as well as cable vision, data and 
mobile communication systems. It has also stated that Japan's 
biggest international carrier, KDD, should be allowed to enter the 
domestic market. 
If this plan is implement, which still remains unclear62, regional 
companies will be prohibited from offering cable, long distance or 
international services in their own regions, but they will be able 
to do so outside of their own areas. This plan posits quite a 
different model than that seen in the U.S. following the breakup of 
ATT. In the U.S. case, the baby bells remained regulated and 
guaranteed access to local phone service. The Council's proposal 
suggest the possibility of greater competitive entry. Initially 
shares of the new regional entities would remain quasi-public 
although share ownership restrictions will apparently also be 
distance calls must originate and terminate. Payments to NTT for 
handling the local part of their long-distance calls comprise 
over 49 percent of their total revenues. And NTT has retained 
nearly a complete monopoly on local calling. NTT has also 
managed to keep 
competitors out of the local market with its ability to undercut 
their charges. See, JEI Report No. 8B, March 1, 1996. 
62
 Arguments against this plan have been raised by NTT's 
President. Specifically, he has argued that the plan does not 
guarantee that competition will intensify. Further, he argues 
that: the level of service could decline and costs rise, 
particularly as revenues from long-distance operations would no 
longer subsidize local service; and that Japan needs a flagship 
telecommunications carrier to represent it in international fora, 
among other arguments. See, JEI Report No. 8B, Id. 
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relaxed if the Council's recommendations are implemented. Foreign 
shares will be permitted to grow from the current ceiling of 20 
percent to less than one-third. 
The future structure that is envisioned is not, however, entirely-
unregulated. The plan recommends that MPT regulate the rates and 
conditions under which NTT regional entities can share their 
networks with competitors. Regulatory oversight will remain 
highly centralized and under the sole jurisdiction of the MPT. 
This is in contrast to the U.S. model where the FCC, the Department 
of Justice, courts and state commissions all provide various 
dimensions of oversight.63 
At a minimum, it seems fair to infer from this brief summary of 
recent history that telecommunications is a sector in which 
regulatory policy has lagged well behind technological 
developments, and where a complex mix of domestic and international 
market pressures have obliged changes in regulatory structure. 
3. Foreign Pressure 
Much--perhaps too much--has been written on the role of "gaiatsu" . 
63
 Another structural difference between U.S. and Japanese 
regulatory practices is reflected in the fact that MPT is headed 
by a politician, usually with little prior knowledge of 
telecommunications, while the FCC, in contrast, has often been 
chaired by an expert appointee. 
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Although I would argue that the role for gaiatsu has changed 
considerable over the last decade, it has unquestionably been an 
important agent of regulatory reform in the decade of the 1980's 
and remains so to some degree to this day.64 The foregoing 
discussion of telecommunications is illustrative. 
In numerous instances, international trade policy initiatives (both 
multilateral and bilateral) have obliged government officials to 
modify domestic regulations that have had intended and unintended 
consequences for foreign and new market entrants. Such issues have 
arisen repeatedly within the context of bilateral U.S-Japan trade 
friction., 
In the 1988-1992 period alone, the United States and Japan entered 
into some 13 bilateral agreements. These included four agreements 
I have argued elsewhere that foreign pressure has been 
especially effective when the following conditions are present: 
first, a globally competitive U.S. industry committed to 
penetrating the Japanese market and prepared, when necessary, to 
stay the course in negotiations that can become highly 
contentious. Second, a willingness on the part of the U.S. 
Government to apply bilateral and multilateral economic and 
political pressure on the Japanese Government for corrective 
measures. Third, the ability of the Japanese Government to 
deliver on those requests. Fourth, the existence of 
constituencies in Japan that see U.S. demands as in their 
economic interests or at least legitimate on their own terms. 
Fifth, the negotiation of measures that provide an effective 
context for on-going monitoring efforts by U.S. and Japanese 
government officials. Sixth, an identification of market access 
priorities that reinforce market trends, see, M.E. Janow, 
"Trading with an Ally" in G. Curtis, ed., The United States, 
Japan and Asia (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995). 
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covering Japanese Government internal procurement practices and 
procedures (supercomputers, satellites, construction services and 
computer hardware and software), five agreements covering Japanese 
government telecommunications standards, regulations and licensing 
procedures (third party radio and cellular telephone, 
telecommunications equipment and three agreements on international 
value-added telecommunication services), one agreement covering 
technical standards (wood products), and three agreements covering 
market access problems involving both government policies and 
private practices (amorphous metals, semiconductors and paper 
products). 
There were also other initiatives such as the Structural 
Impediments Initiative that resulted in some changes to Japan's 
Large Scale Retail Store Law and Anti-Monopoly Act, and focused 
attention to internal practices with respect to land use, 
administrative guidance, customs procedures and other regulatory 
matters. 
As formal border barriers to trade have been gradually reduced 
through multilateral trade negotiations, trade negotiations with 
Japan have come to focus increasingly on internal regulations that 
can distort trade and access to markets. Regulatory schemes that 
may have been designed largely with domestic concerns in mind are 
now being subjected to considerable international scrutiny. 
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Recent attention to Japan's treatment of software and sound 
recordings under its intellectual property laws (which are under 
MITI and MOE's jurisdiction), its allegedly discriminatory taxation 
of alcoholic beverages (which is under MOF's jurisdiction), 
allegations of inadequate enforcement of Japan's competition laws 
(which are under the JFTC's jurisdiction) and Japan's regulation of 
entry and products in its insurance markets (which are under MOF's 
jurisdiction) are but a few examples of the range of regulatory 
matters and agencies that are now subject to intense foreign 
scrutiny. 
In some of the sectoral disputes between the United States and 
Japan, the United States sought remedial steps in the form of 
deregulatory actions by the Government of Japan--notable examples 
include telecommunications and standards, licensing and 
certification related agreements. More commonly, the U.S. 
Government sought to remove what it saw as discriminatory or anti-
competitive biases in Japan's regulatory arrangements and the 
introduction of measures to increase administrative transparency, 
accountability, fairness and market access. 
Viewed from a historical perspective, Japan in the 1990s has 
witnessed considerable regulatory reform and some economic 
deregulation. However, I share the view well expressed by John 
Haley that there is little evidence that the reforms reflect 
ideological changes with respect to the proper role of the state in 
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directing or managing the economy. Rather, reforms have been 
undertaken in response to market or other changes that domestic 
regulators could not ignore for one reason or another, rather than 
owing to any fundamental shift in economic policy making or 
ideology.65 
C. The Current Deregulation Debate in Japan 
As we turn now to look at the current climate for economic 
deregulation in Japan, we will consider the applicability of the 
Derthwick & Quirk factors to contemporary developments in Japan. 
Namely, in the Japanese context, is there perceived to be a 
powerful economic logic for further economic deregulation? If so, 
is this backed by extensive empirical analyses conducted by 
independent researchers? If not, does it matter? More generally, is 
there a convergence of elite opinion in favor of economic 
deregulation? Do agents of change hold powerful positions of 
leadership? Are there institutional mechanisms supportive of 
change? And finally, what role, if any, is foreign pressure 
playing or likely to play? 
As we noted in the discussion of NTT reform, the traditional 
regulatory failure rationale for further economic deregulation and 
regulatory reform, which we have seen in the U.S. and elsewhere, is 
clearly part of the debate in Japan. Nor has this debate been 
65
 See, J. Haley, supra note 47 at 125. 
45 
limited to the telecommunications area. Even MITI commented in its 
1995 White paper: " in order to reduce the domestic/external price 
gap we must correct the gap in productivity which is brought about 
by anticompetitive and inefficient regulations and trading 
practices. "66 
Several government agencies (such as MITI, EPA, and to some degree 
MOF) have produced and disseminated official documents stressing 
that economic deregulation would enable firms to move into more 
promising lines of business and consumers to enjoy the price 
benefits of yen appreciation.67 
Publications issued both by private research institutes and 
business groups stress that deregulation would have the added 
benefit of reducing government intervention in the economy and 
detailed oversight of business activities. Deregulation has been 
cited by Japanese as well as foreign business leaders as offering 
66
 Tsusho Hakusho at 146. 
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 According to a 1995 MITI White Paper, for example, in 
November 1993 the cost of living in Tokyo was 41 percent higher 
than in New York. Durable goods were 3 6 percent higher, clothing 
64 percent higher and food 62 percent higher. MITI also found 
that prices for traded goods, raw materials, intermediate goods, 
and capital goods were 3 0 percent higher than in the United 
States, 19 percent higher than in Germany and 4 6 percent higher 
than in South Korea. Services were found to be 51 percent higher 
than in the U.S., 96 percent higher than in Germany and 475 
percent higher than in Korea. MITI, in 1995, widely disseminated 
the results of a survey that it had conducted of businesses which 
found that Japanese firms identified excessive government 
regulations as the main reason for price gaps in services. 
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the possibility of an improved business climate for new market 
entrants both foreign and domestic. 
Is advocacy of economic deregulation new? No. The importance of 
deregulation for the Japanese economy is, in fact, not a new idea. 
As noted in the previous discussion, in the early 1980s, a 
government commission under the chairmanship of Toshio Doko, former 
chairman of Keidanren, stressed the importance of deregulation as 
a means of reducing government expenditures and rationalizing 
administrative procedures. In the mid-1980s, a commission under 
the chairmanship of Haruo Maekawa, former Bank of Japan governor, 
advocated deregulation as one of a number of measures designed to 
stimulate domestic demand and increase imports. 
More recently the efforts of the Hosokawa administration, and in 
particular the interim and final conclusions of its Hiraiwa 
Commission report of late 1993, have again beemed a spotlight onto 
the issue of deregulation. These reports argued that deregulation 
was a major means of achieving an open, vital, consumer-oriented 
society in harmony with the world community68. 
The report made it plain that economic deregulation should be the 
rule not the exception. The interim report argued that 
institutional and programmatic approaches were needed. For example, 
See, A Report by the Advisory Group for Economic and 
Structural Reform. December 16, 1993. 
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it argued that a deregulation headquarters needed to be established 
in the Cabinet and headed by the Prime Minister. Further, that an 
impartial governmental organization should be established by law to 
monitor implementation and issue recommendations to ensure that 
deregulation proved effective. The report attached a list of some 
500 regulations and laws as examples of rules to be eliminated or 
revised. The report also stressed that: 
fundamental revisions, while placing a burden on certain 
portions of the socio-economic structure in the short term, 
are absolutely essential in the medium and long term to 
construct a free socio-economic system based on the principles 
of self responsibility and market mechanism69. 
After the Hiraiwa Commission report was issued, an Administrative 
Reform Headquarters was established in the Prime Minister's Office. 
Later, in June of 1994, a package of deregulatory measures was 
announced. In March of 19 95, a five year deregulation package 
finally was released. (The government later decided to accelerate 
the timetable to three years). The March plan was comprised of some 
1091 items in 11 areas, including distribution, housing, labor, and 
telecommunications70. 
Although long on lists of laws and regulations and relatively short 
on a targeted agenda, the plan did stipulate that its purpose was 
69
 See, Interim Report of the Advisory Group for Economic 
and Structural Reform, November 1993. 
70
 Of these, the largest categories were as follows: some 
23 9 items in the category of standards, certification and import 
processing; 168 items in transportation, 121 in distribution, 131 
in hazardous materials, disaster prevention and public safety, 86 
in housing, 53 in information and telecommunications, etc. 
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to improve the nation's quality of life by narrowing internal and 
external price differentials, to remove economic regulations in 
principle, to minimize social regulations in line with policy goals 
and to undertake a number of industry related deregulatory 
initiatives71. 
In light of these developments, can one say that elite opinion has 
converged in favor of further economic deregulation? Thus far, the 
answer is far from clear. 
1. Pro-Reform Voices 
Japanese constituencies that have voiced support for deregulation 
are diverse. In the business community, supporters include a 
number of major business groups such as Keidanren, Nikkeiren, and 
Keizai Doyukai. While the Hiraiwa Commission was meeting and after 
the release of its report, various business groups undertook a 
number of initiatives to keep the deregulation issue alive. For 
example, Keidanren conducted its own studies on the gains to the 
71
 See, JEI Report No 20A, May 26, 1995. With respect to 
specific actions, it indicates for example, that the GOJ would 
liberalize leased lines to public telephone networks, simplify 
procedures government imports of foreign cosmetics, change food 
labeling requirements showing the last date the food is edible 
rather than the date of production, allow brokers to sell 
insurance, lift restrictions on setting up gas stations in 
certain areas, end in October 1995 the maximum period for time 
deposits, ease car inspections, expand taxi firm's districts, 
review and revise the deregulation program annual, review by the 
end of FY 1997 the ban on holding companies, strengthen the JFTC 
and review by the end of FY 1999 the Large Scale Retail Store 
Law. 
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economy that would be accrued through economic deregulation72. 
Keidanren also released a paper in 1994 urging the government to 
adopt an approach to economic deregulation that incorporated 
principles of zero base, openness, and sunset, all principles drawn 
from U.S. experiences with regulatory reform. The "zero base" 
principle would require evaluation of all existing regulations. 
Under the "sunset" principle, all new regulations would be reviewed 
within five years, and the "open" principle envisioned that 
interested parties would be permitted to provide input whenever 
legislation with a regulatory impact was debated in the Diet. This 
would also require government officials to disclose drafts of 
cabinet and ministerial orders involving regulations73. 
Support for economic deregulation does not appear to be limited to 
the business community. Numerous Japanese academics have analyzed 
the sectoral effects of Japan's regulatory policies and some have 
advanced both specific and general deregulation proposals. The four 
major daily publications of Nikkei have written 7208 articles on 
deregulation over the last three years. 
72
 For example, one Keidanren report estimated that between 
FY 1995-2000, deregulation would result in aggregate increases in 
real GDP of some 177 trillion yen. Aggregate increases in jobs 
would amount to approximately 740,000 workers. See, Kisei Kanwa 
no Keizai Koka ni Kansuru Bunseki to Koyotaisaku, Keidanren. 
November 15, 19 94. 
73
 See, JEI Report 20A May 26, 1995. 
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A survey by Keidanren released in October, 1995, found that 94 
percent of the respondents were interested in deregulation. Some 
8 8 percent said that they would be able to accept an increase in 
"self responsibility" as a result of deregulation.74 (The latter 
point is important because bureaucrats often argue that the public 
is in favor of deregulation until it affects them adversely, at 
which point, they seek government assistance and redress). 
All major political parties have made further economic reform and 
deregulation as part of their official platforms. To this extent, 
elite opinion has converged in favor of further regulatory reform 
and economic deregulation. Yet, there appear to be a number of 
obstacles in the way of further economic reform and deregulation. 
Let us briefly identify those challenges. 
2. Challenges to Deregulation 
a) Opponents 
First, deregulation has its detractors and some have been quite 
vocal in their opposition. Less public, but nonetheless effective, 
opposition from within and outside of the government has reportedly 
quashed any number of specific proposals that had surfaced from 
within the government and from outside sources. 
4
 See, The Japan Times. October 10, 1995. 
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Some labor groups have stepped into the fray, expressing concern 
about the employment consequences of deregulation. An unidentified 
anti-deregulation group last year penned an article in a prominent 
Japanese magazine entitled " A Nightmare Called Deregulation" which 
purported to examine U.S. experiences with deregulation in the 
airlines, trucking and financial services sectors. This article, 
which received a lot of attention, argued that the U.S. experiences 
resulted in job losses, exacerbated income disparities, and failed 
to create new industries or jobs.75 Those assertions were then 
rebutted by several prominent Japanese academic economists.76 
Some ministries and agencies, notably MITI and the EPA, appear to 
be advocates of deregulation. However, other government ministries 
are resisting deregulation on specific and general grounds. Some 
consumer groups have opposed relaxation of restrictions, on health 
and safety grounds. 
As a result of this interplay between supporters and opponents, a 
number of the proposals put forward by the Hiraiwa Commission were 
watered down. For example, bureaucrats resisted the notion of 
creating a new powerful impartial organization whose mission would 
be to map-out and monitor the implementation of deregulation 
proposals. Clearly, they saw such an organization as trespassing on 
75
 See, Bungei Shunju, August 1994. 
76
 See, Nakatani Iwao and Ito Takatoshi, Economist August 
30, 1994. 
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their own bureaucratic turf. Such an organization was eventually-
created, but it is being coordinated out of the Prime Minister's 
office.77 Even supporters of deregulation have issued stinging 
critiques of the "wishy washy, something-for-everyone-but-not-
enough-for anyone approach" to deregulation that has come out of 
the government.78 
b) An Uncertain Political Climate 
A second and related challenge to economic deregulation is the 
current political climate. Especially during this period of 
political transition it is unlikely that politicians will 
voluntarily raise those economic issues that polarize voters and 
that are not perceived by the public as requiring urgent attention. 
The current "jusen" situation is seen as a crisis requiring 
corrective measures. It is not clear whether important political 
leaders will use their scarce political capital to take on other 
economic reform issues that may be perceived to be of a less urgent 
nature. 
The current Prime Minister, Ryutaro Hashimoto, is widely 
acknowledged by Japanese bureaucrats to be a decisive politician, 
77
 More recently, a deregulation subcommittee has been 
established in April, 1995. Headed by the chairman of IBM Japan, 
Takeo Shiina, the committee holds hearings and discusses 
proposals on some 46 items identified by the government. 
78
 See, Nakatani Iwao, Economic Eye. Autumn 1994. 
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especially well versed in economic matters. His political future 
is far from assured, public support for economic deregulation is 
obviously mixed, and the intensity of his commitment to wide-
ranging economic reform and deregulation is ambiguous. 
Indeed, although Japanese politics underwent a dramatic development 
when the LDP dominance in the Diet came to an end in the summer of 
1993, and although there is widespread public dissatisfaction with 
Japanese politics, observers of Japanese politics are divided over 
the degree to which substantive policy issues are, or are not, 
likely to dominate the political process. I am fairly pessimistic 
in this regard. The major parties, the LDP and the Shinshinto, are 
both conservative parties. Both are striving to appeal to the same 
body of voters, and both are gearing up for the first major 
election under the new rules. This means that both parties are 
stressing very similar and rather amorphous campaign themes: the 
need for reform, growth, deregulation and change. A bold and 
specific timetable on economic deregulation does not appear to be 
a highly visible part of the program. 
c) An Ambiguous Public Mandate for Change 
A third and related challenge to economic deregulation and 
regulatory reform is the absence of strong public sentiment 
insisting upon the necessity of such reforms. 
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Voter dissatisfaction with Japan's politicians and bureaucrats may 
be pronounced, but still there is no pervasive sense of crisis. 
According to an August 1995 opinion poll conducted by the Prime 
Minster's Office, 72.7 percent of the respondents said that they 
were content with their current standard of living. This survey has 
been conducted annually by the government since 1958; the latest 
survey revealed public satisfaction with their living conditions to 
be at an all time high.79 
If this really is an accurate window into public attitudes, then 
one might well question whether there is really sufficient public 
unhappiness with the current state of economic and political 
affairs to produce the requisite pressure on both politicians and 
bureaucrats to cause them to depart significantly from current 
practices. 
d) Structural Constraints 
A variety of structural features of Japanese policymaking 
institutions and their role in regulatory reform suggest a very 
different dynamic than that described by Derthwick and Quirk. 
Several different aspects of that dynamic are worth brief comment 
here: the entrenched position of bureaucrats, the limited role of 
the courts, and the historically weak role of competition policy 
enforcement. 
79
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Under usual circumstances, bureaucrats exert a high degree of 
control over policy formulation. Expertise on economic and other 
policy issues resides primarily in the bureaucracy. Historically, 
virtually all legislation has been drafted by bureaucrats and goes 
to the Diet through the Cabinet rather than through member bills. 
Interpellations from the Diet usually are defended by senior 
bureaucrats. Political appointees to ministries are very few in 
number--usually only the Minister and the Parliamentary Vice 
Minister--and Ministers traditionally have had very little say over 
personnel decisions within a Ministry. Although some LDP policy 
committees have built up considerable expertise on selective policy 
issues, rarely have such political organs been the central locus of 
legislative initiatives. Even though some Japanese politicians 
argue that politicians must exert more control over the bureaucracy 
and become better educated on policy matters, the status quo shows 
little signs of disappearing anytime soon.80 Also, there appear to 
be few mechanisms within the Diet or elsewhere analogous to the 
power and independence of Congressional Committees and their staffs 
which might serve as a central fulcrum for ideas and policy 
initiatives. Professor Gerald Curtis has observed that the U.S. 
bureaucracy is weaker, and control by Congress over policy making 
stronger, than in any parliamentary system. In some ways, Japan is 
80
 Ichiro Ozawa, for example, has suggested that government 
ministries should be infused with politicians and politicians 
need to assume more responsibility over policymaking. See, 
Ichiro Ozawa Blueprint for a New Japan. 1994. 
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on one end of this spectrum and the United States the other.81 
Some analysts have concluded that politicians in Japan do not 
matter a great deal because the bureaucrats are really in charge of 
economic matters and politicians are little more than window 
dressing. Subscribers to this point of view tend to assert that 
bureaucrats and politicians are captive to special interests, and 
therefore it is unrealistic to expect meaningful reforms to come 
out of the bureaucracy let alone out of political circles. I for 
one think this perspective fails to pick up nuances important to 
Japan's political economy. 
in my former experience as a trade negotiator for the U.S. 
Government, I observed that most of the regulatory reform proposals 
that arose in the context of trade disputes emanated from within 
the bureaucracy itself--albeit in the face of foreign pressure. 
Political intervention, however, often was critical. Why is this? 
Career civil servants often appear to have difficulty reaching 
agreement on issues when the proposed policy matter is either 
strongly opposed by domestic private interests or by other 
bureaucrats. Resolving problems appears to be especially difficult 
when issues cut across the jurisdiction of several ministries. In 
such circumstances, Japan's politicians have often played an 
important role in brokering compromises. This dynamic has been 
81
 See, Gerald L. Curtis Japanese Politics in Comparative 
Perspective. August 1995. 
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important in the context of trade issues between the United States 
and Japan, but it has also arisen in the context of domestic 
economic policy disputes as well. 
At the current time, with the power base of politicians is so 
notably in flux, their ability to broker compromise between 
competing interests is more limited than in the past. 
If this is so, is judicial review of administrative action or 
private litigation the more likely to drive economic deregulation 
and regulatory reform? Japan's legal tradition, at least since the 
Meiji era, has been to draft extremely general language in the body 
of legislation, thereby leaving the bureaucracy wide latitude 
within which to exercise its discretion depending on circumstances 
prevailing at the time. Informal and nonbinding administrative 
guidance also has been characteristic of much of Japan's approach 
to government oversight of economic activity. 
There is an enduring, though not uniform, tradition of heeding 
informal suggestions put forward by government officials. The 
reasons for this are diverse. Some of these reasons include: 
because enabling legislation might be assumed to exist (or could be 
created); because retaliation for non-compliance is feared through 
bureaucratic exercise of collateral powers; because administrative 
guidance affords both sides a desired degree of flexibility; or 
because recourse to judicial review has been so weak that private 
58 
parties are reluctant to challenge a bureaucrat's authority. 
Indeed, judicial review of administrative guidance has been 
limited. In order for administrative actions to be reviewable they 
must constitute an administrative disposition (shobun) or other 
exercise of public power. Since administrative guidance in Japan 
is by definition an informal process, it tends to fall outside of 
this definition.82 
In the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII), the Japanese 
Government committed itself to put all administrative guidance in 
writing and to only use it in exceptional circumstances. While in 
government service I negotiated that SII language, and I have 
occasionally asked Japanese officials in the intervening years 
whether administrative guidance is now routinely written down and 
published. The question is usually met with some bafflement. A 
number of savvy officials have responded to the question, perhaps 
tongue in cheek, that administrative guidance is now entirely a 
thing of the past--except in areas where they are obliged to 
encourage domestic firms to voluntarily increase their purchases of 
82
 F. Upham, supra note 48. Scholars who have looked at 
this question in some detail tend to conclude that Japanese 
courts have reached the merits in reviewing administrative 
guidance in only a small class of cases. Agency action tends to 
be upheld so long as it constituted a good faith attempt to 
encourage and implement negotiation, attempting to resolve 
conflicts among the various affected groups. See, for example, 
Michael Young, infra note 83 and Jonathan Weinburg, "Broadcasting 
and the Administrative Process in Japan and the U.S." Buff. Law. 
Rev. Fall 1991. 
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foreign goods. If these responses are representative, there is 
little evidence that that particular SI I undertaking is common 
knowledge or being implemented. 
It also seems that domestic interests are only infrequently 
challenging Japanese government agencies for their continued use of 
informal measures. Why is this so? 
Part of the answer lies in the flexibility that administrative 
guidance affords to both sides. It is probably a mistake to see 
administrative guidance as simply a one sided process, favored by 
bureaucrats and resented by Japanese business executives. It is 
more likely the case that administrative guidance is favored when 
the affected interests benefit from it and resented when it obliges 
them to act or refrain from acting as they would otherwise prefer. 
Administrative guidance affords a high degree of flexibility to 
both government officials and private parties and carries with it 
less accountability as compared with more formal measures that 
might either elicit public scrutiny or require legislative 
authority. 
It is probably also a mistake to view Japanese bureaucrats as 
necessarily pro-active and decisive regulators. Numerous 
regulatory and trade problems have arisen precisely because 
regulators delegated important decision-making to the affected 
interests. Professor Michael Young, in an important article on 
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administrative guidance written some years ago put it well: 
administrative organs in Japan often seek to enshrine 
bargaining and negotiation between parties as the principle 
device for allocating regulatory burdens. Instead of relying 
on agency determinations, Japanese administrators have turned 
to enforced bargaining and negotiation. Administrators 
reallocate bargaining power between the parties so as to 
assure serious negotiations, but then distance themselves from 
the process, thereby allowing parties themselves to make the 
difficult determinations.83 
Although Professor Young's article is now over a decade old, we 
continue to see contemporary expressions of his characterization of 
Japanese regulatory methods. 
A well-publicized example in the retail sector is the Large Scale 
Retail Store Law (LSRSL) . This law was designed to protect small 
and medium size independent merchants from competition by large 
scale chain stores84. Professor Frank Upham has argued that the 
LSRSL and the manner of its implementation may reflect a regulatory 
regime designed largely in response to such domestic social and 
political interests, where domestic regulators delegated its power 
to small private interests. Given the way the law worked in 
practice, large retailers had to purchase the right to open a store 
83
 See, Michael K. Young, "Judicial Review of Administrative 
Guidance: Governmentally Encouraged Consensual Dispute Resolution 
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 The domestic law came under attack by larger domestic 
firms seeking to establish chains, it also became a symbol of a 
structural constraint to market access when foreign firms tried 
to enter the market and could not because of the law and its 
manner of implementation. See, Frank Upham, "A Tentative Model 
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from small retailers. Professor Upham argues that that right was 
created not by law but rather by the government, through its de 
facto decision to delegate authority to local retailers. Whether 
this practice came into existence by design or accident, this 
regulatory scheme also contributed to the formation of cartels on 
the national, regional, and local levels.85 It also thwarted entry 
by those large firms (including foreign firms) that were seeking to 
sell in the local market. 
In recent years, regulatory methods of Japanese government agencies 
have become the focus of international attention and domestic 
public dissatisfaction and debate. There have been a number of 
scandals involving procurement practices in the construction and 
transportation sectors that appear to have increased public 
interest in enhanced transparency and accountability of government 
actions. The passage of the long-studied Administrative Procedures 
Law (APL) is one expression of this development. An intriguing 
question for the future is whether this law will actually be used, 
either by industries or individuals, to challenge formal as well as 
informal agency conduct. The APL provides only limited coverage 
over informal measures such as administrative guidance; it will be 
most interesting to see whether this proves a subject of domestic 
debate in Japan. 
Another topic of great importance is the future role competition 
85
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policy will play in Japan. 
The JFTC, which administers the Anti-Monopoly Law, has had an 
anomalous position in Japanese society since its inception in 1947. 
In the early postwar years there was a great deal of opposition to 
its very existence, and few expected it to gain authority or 
legitimacy. Gradually it has attained some of both, but this has 
fluctuated over the years and has often depended on the personal 
dynamism of its chairman. 
For most of the postwar period, the JFTC has been under intense 
pressures for inaction from politicians and other government 
agencies. The long standing institutional tension between the FTC 
and MITI erupted into open hostility in two famous cases: the 
merger of Yawata and Fuji Steel in 1969, and the allegations by the 
FTC in 1974 that member companies in the Petroleum Industry 
Association had illegally restricted supply even when doing so at 
MITI's behest. The first case helped to establish the principle 
that the JFTC was the body that had a right to pass judgment on the 
desirability of proposed mergers. In the oil case, the FTC actually 
filed charges of illegal activity to restrict production and fix 
prices and oil executives contended that their actions were 
legitimate because they were based on administrative guidance. A 
court judgment in 1980 ruled that MITI lacked the authority to use 
administrative guidance to induce firms to take actions that were 
otherwise illegal. The decision although extremely important, it 
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still left many unanswered questions as to how much latitude MITI 
could take. 
Open hostility between the JFTC and MITI now appears to be much 
reduced. Indeed, MITI officials now argue that MITI is a serious 
proponent of economic deregulation and regulatory reform and has 
itself become a champion of more vigorous enforcement of 
competition laws. At the same time, MITI's handling of certain 
sectors that are under its direct jurisdiction has, on occasion, 
been curious. 
In 1993, in the face of much international criticism of business 
practices in Japan's glass industry, the JFTC conducted a survey of 
competitive conditions in that market and concluded that while the 
Anti-Monopoly Act (AMA) had not been violated, certain business 
practices were problematic. MITI, for its part, then issued 
guidelines identifying what in its opinion constituted good 
business practices. It also urged Japanese glass manufacturers to 
make certain adjustments in their business dealings, especially 
with regard to fidelity rebate schemes used by glass manufacturers 
with their affiliated distributors. These MITI guidelines 
presumably had no legal enforceability but were designed to 
supplement the findings of the JFTC and to alert the domestic 
industry to certain changes in business practices that MITI wanted 
to see materialize. In this somewhat curious fashion, the glass 
case may provide a "window" into the new rapproachment between the 
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two agencies. 
Several other areas that may provide some insight into the future 
role of JFTC enforcement as well as JFTC's relations with other 
ministries are exemplified by JFTC's stance on exemptions and 
administrative guidance. Existing exemptions under the AMA are 
currently being "studied" by the JFTC. In years past MITI argued 
forcefully that most existing exemptions, especially those covering 
industries under their purview should be maintained.86 It will be 
fascinating to see whether MITI is now prepared to accept the 
removal of AMA exemptions. In addition, the JFTC has in recent 
years periodically criticized other ministries, including MITI, for 
using administrative guidance. Recently, as part of the 
government's deregulation campaign, the JFTC has been charged with 
the difficult task of ensuring that government agencies do not 
undercut deregulatory measures through informal measures such as 
administrative guidance. JFTC's efforts in this challenging area 
are worth careful examination. 
The perceived inadequacies of the JFTC in its enforcement of 
Japan's competition laws has become a source of international trade 
tension. Recent years have brought some positive developments for 
those who believe than an effective competition regime would 
benefit the Japanese economy and enhance opportunities for foreign 
86
 If I recall properly, the AMA exemption for barber shops 
was eliminated without MITI opposition. It may now be possible to 
get a (somewhat) cheaper haircut in Japan. 
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firms to access the Japanese market. Notable developments in this 
regard include: increases in the JFTC's budget and personnel; 
certain amendments to the AMA that increase penalties for 
anticompetitive conduct; increased enforcement actions; and certain 
procedural improvements aimed at reducing obstacles to private 
litigation. 
e. What Role Foreign Pressure? 
The Japanese Government, to its credit, has invited all interested 
foreign parties to comment on its economic deregulation proposals. 
It also has permitted some foreign interests to testify before 
certain committees studying deregulation. The U.S. and the E.U. 
governments have put forward detailed comments.87 
Economic deregulation is one area where foreign interests and 
domestic interests can overlap. The interests of foreign companies 
and governments on the one hand, and Japanese new to market firms 
and consumer on the other, often are complementary. Deregulation 
offers a potential vehicle for channeling that complementarity. 
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 The submissions differ in a number of respects. The U.S. 
government commentary contains extensive discussion of broad 
policy approaches that are seen as facilitating the creation of 
more open, competitive and transparent regulatory regimes. The 
U.S. Government also submitted an extensive list of regulatory 
reforms that it believes should be undertaken on a sectoral 
basis. Most of these are problems that have long been identified 
by the U.S. The submissions of the European Business community 
focus, almost exclusively, on specific sectoral problems arising 
from regulatory practices in Japan. 
66 
Foreign firms seek expanded access to the Japanese market and the 
removal of regulatory constraints that hamper such access. To the 
extent that such regulations raise costs to consumers and also 
thwart entry for new-to-market domestic firms, foreign and domestic 
interests are likely to share an interest in further deregulation 
and regulatory reform. This may increase the receptivity of 
domestic interests in subjects of reform identified by foreign 
parties. As noted earlier, in my view, historically foreign 
pressure has been the most effective when it has echoed the need 
the change identified by powerful domestic interests.88 
In fact, there have often been important and vocal 
supporters within Japan for trade or regulatory reforms 
identified by the U.S. or other governments. For example, during 
the beef and citrus negotiations there were editorials in 
Japanese papers suggesting that concessions to the United States 
would benefit the interests of consumers and pointing out that 
the quota system provided undue profits to those handling the 
quotas at the expense of the consumer. In 1983, a group of 
Japanese economists proposed liberalization of agricultural 
products including beef and citrus. In 1985, the Maekawa Report 
called for more opening of the agricultural market emphasizing 
the importance of consumer views. Even the difficult issue of 
rice liberalization eventually produced domestic supporters. In 
early 1993, more than a hundred intellectuals and experts signed 
an advertisement calling for acceptance of tariffication of rice. 
Support within Japan for U.S. trade objectives was especially 
evident during the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII). This 
is in one sense not surprising because U.S. negotiators took 
great pains to try and identify issues that would benefit U.S. 
firms and yet were already contentious domestic issues in Japan. 
For example, when the U.S. identified the Large Scale Retail 
Store Law as an impediment to new market entrants seeking to 
establish larger retail chains, there were already Japanese 
retail chains pressing for reform. A poll by Asahi Shimbun in May 
1990 showed some 58 percent of the respondents in favor of 
reducing regulations over large stores. 
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Any number of steps could yet be taken by private interests or 
foreign governments to reinforce this complementarity of interests. 
Thus far, private or public initiatives have been limited but on-
going. Separate bilateral consultations on economic deregulation 
between the U.S. and Japan and the E.U. and Japan have occurred. 
U.S. and European Chambers of Commerce have prepared fairly 
detailed commentary outlining specific areas where economic 
deregulation or reform would prove advantageous to foreign firms. 
In this sense, it is not only U.S. firms that have an interest in 
further economic deregulation and regulatory reform but indeed all 
foreign firms that are seeking expanded access to the Japanese 
market. 
At the current time, the U.S. government, for its part, does not 
seem to be putting much negotiating energy into bilateral 
consultations on economic deregulation. The reasons for this are 
not fully known, but it is likely that such negotiations are not 
seen as likely to produce tangible results in the near term. 
On a more optimistic note, the subject continues to attract 
domestic and international attention along many different 
dimensions. The OECD, for example, has undertaken a number of 
studies on country experiences with economic deregulation and 
regulatory reform. It has several working groups examining sectoral 
and other effects. Those discussions may serve the useful purpose 
of alerting member countries to global trends. In the past, the 
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need to keep up with world trends has offered Japanese officials a 
needed rationale for undertaking reforms that were unpopular at 
home. 
IV. Concluding Observations 
Economic deregulation and regulatory reform is now a global 
phenomena. Traditional rationales for regulation have come to be 
challenged for a variety of reasons. Inefficiencies produced by 
earlier methods and justifications for regulation have become 
increasingly evident as market conditions have altered. But, as 
noted at the outset of this paper, while economic deregulation and 
regulatory reform is now widespread, the process is far from a 
linear nor predictable one across nations. 
In Japan as well, initial rationales for regulation have proven in 
some areas to impose greater costs than benefits for both the 
regulated sector and the economy as a whole. In this sense, the 
Japanese experience with economic deregulation and regulatory 
reform shares some common elements with developments elsewhere in 
the world. Regulation in Japan still, of course, has its unique 
features which are producing their own particular dynamic over 
time. 
Diverse and powerful interests within Japanese society now see 
economic deregulation and reform as necessary for Japan's continued 
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economic growth and vitality. These groups are more visible and 
vocal than in years past. Economic deregulation and regulatory 
reform also is being cast by important government and private 
sector groups as a competitive necessity and an international 
responsibility. 
The perspectives offered in this paper on the forces driving 
regulatory reform in the postwar period has suggested that domestic 
and international market and technological factors have converged 
to necessitate on-going regulatory reforms. The costs to the 
Japanese economy of failing to continue the process of economic 
deregulation, and the domestic and international pressures in favor 
of economic deregulation seem to be sufficiently great that further 
reform initiatives are likely. 
This being said, the institutional mechanisms that exist in the 
U.S. and elsewhere to drive reform--or tolerate it--do not appear 
to be fully available in Japan. For example, Japanese political 
leaders do not seem to have the institutional power base, nor 
perhaps the political will or public mandate to push through 
comprehensive reforms. To date, it is not fully clear that elite 
opinion has converged in support of economic deregulation. 
Regulatory agencies have less of a tradition of independent 
leadership than has been the case elsewhere. There have been no 
examples of deregulation resulting in the elimination of regulatory 
agencies nor, more importantly, a broadening or redefining of 
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regulatory oversight to include more than the existing regulatory-
authority. It is unclear whether or not academic researchers at 
major universities are producing policy-relevant sectoral analyses 
that are having a defining impact on the policy process. Japanese 
courts have not historically played a visible role in obliging 
agencies to avoid arbitrary and capricious regulations or have 
themselves been major agents of regulatory change. And, competition 
policy enforcement, though certainly more visible than in years 
past, remains less vigorous than in other advanced industrial 
economies. 
My own expectation, therefore, is that economic deregulation will 
be a protracted and uneven process in Japan. 
These broad generalizations of course only provide a small window 
into the political economy of deregulation in Japan. We have not,of 
course, addressed the specific reforms that are likely to be 
introduced, the lessons learned from foreign experiences with 
deregulation, nor the sectoral priorities that are likely to 
predominate at any given period. Much will depend on the perceived 
costs and benefits of economic deregulation and regulatory reform 
on a sectoral basis. 
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